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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARKF.LEPPERT, 
Petitioner, Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, 
"Vo" 
CATHERINE L. LEPPERT, 
Respondent, Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee. 
• REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT and 
• BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE 
Appellate Case No. 20060872 
Lower Court No. 044904145 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE L.A. DEVER 
Appellant and Cross Appellee, Catherine L. Leppert, ("Catherine") by and through 
counsel, hereby submits the following as her Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. CATHERINE HAS EMPLOYED CORRECT STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW. 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In The Award Of Alimony And 
Entered Findings Of Fact Which Were Clearly Erroneous. 
The trial court erred in imputing income to Catherine, in the amount of alimony 
awarded and in reducing and eliminating alimony upon future events. Catherine correctly 
identified the standard of review in her challenge of the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant ("Mark") misstates the appropriate standard of review of a trial 
1 
court's award of alimony when he asserts that the correct standard is clear error. The 
clearly erroneous standard is applicable to instances in which an Appellant has challenged 
the incorrectness of the trial court's findings of fact. See, Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. "A trial court's findings of fact will not be reversed unless they are clearly 
erroneous, and the trial court's application of the statute to those findings will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion." See, Clark v. Clark. 2001 UT 44, \ 14. 
Catherine has articulated, within each argument, the trial court's clear error in 
regard to certain factual findings. Catherine submits that it is not relevant to this court 
whether the Appellant cited to the clearly erroneous standard of review in her brief. What 
is germane is whether the Appellant provided this court with a basis for finding that 
certain of the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous, and that said finding 
contributed to the trial court's abuse of discretion. 
A trial court's determination of alimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, 
Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78 f 17. In formulating alimony awards a trial court has 
broad discretion, and the award will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or 
manifest injustice or inequity. See, Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct App 1992). 
Catherine acknowledges that this court will not disturb a trial court's alimony award so 
long as the trial court exercised discretion within the appropriate legal standards and 
supported its decision with adequate findings and conclusions. See, Childs v. Childs. 962 
P.2d 942 (Utah Ct App 1982). 
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In this matter, the trial court arrived at an award of alimony that was outside 
appropriate legal standards, resulting in manifest injustice and inequity. The trial court 
supported its decision with erroneous findings. While Catherine has correctly stated the 
applicable standards of review as to each of the issues raised and has pointed out the 
court's clear error in its factual findings, should this court determine that the correct 
standard of review is clear error, as to any of the trial court's ultimate conclusions, 
Catherine has demonstrated that clear error and the trial court should be reversed. 
B. The Trial Court's Factual Findings Regarding Catherine's Ability to 
Work Were Clearly Erroneous. 
The trial court made erroneous findings which led to its legal conclusion to impute 
income. These erroneous findings include "Dr. Vickie Gregory does not believe that 
Respondent is unemployable." (R. 572, 768). At no time did Dr. Gregory testify that 
Catherine was employable. Dr. Gregory testified that she would have a very difficult time 
getting through a job interview and that she would not be able to work and maintain the 
regime that allows her to stay healthy. (R. 742 p. 392:20-23, p. 393:17-20). At one point, 
Dr. Gregory did state: "I don't -1 am not going to say that Ms. Leppert is unemployable, 
because I do not know that that is the case, but she certainly, in my mind would fall 
between unemployable and occupationally disabled. (R. 742 p. 392:18-21). Dr. Gregory 
made it very clear in her testimony that she disagreed with the opinion of Dr. Farnsworth 
regarding Catherine's employability. (R. 742 p. 382:1-9, 11-24; p. 394:1-10). 
The trial court erred in taking the testimony of Dr. Hallie Robbins out of context, 
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by "finding" from Dr. Robbins's testimony that "she is of the opinion that the Respondent 
is so wrapped up in the minutia of the daily activities she has developed that she fails to 
see what to do to get better," without considering the totality of her testimony. Dr. 
Robbins clearly stated that Catherine relies on her supplements, special diet, and food 
intake, like a "diabetic relies on insulin;" and that Catherine would suffer from further 
mental and emotional damage if she was forced to stop her diet without an appropriate 
substitution of care and treatment. (R. 742 pp. 431:22-25, 432:1-2, 433:1-14 and 19-21). 
The trial court also committed clear error in finding that Catherine was diagnosed 
by "Dr. Darrell Anderson"1 with ADHD. (R. 5721f 4, R. 652 % 3, 665 % 4, 75 H 3 and 
767 f 4). There was no witness named Dr. Darrell Anderson. Catherine was not 
diagnosed with ADHD. Mark argues that the court's finding that Catherine had been 
diagnosed with ADHD was not clear error because Dr. Todd Mangum testified that 
Catherine's obsessive compulsiveness was "almost a form of ADD." (R. 743 p. 510:10-
25). This argument ignores the distinction between a finding of an actual diagnosis of a 
medical condition and Dr. Mangum's statement. The trial court made an erroneous 
finding that Catherine had been diagnosed with an illness she did not have, by a doctor 
that appears no where in the trial record. The trial court's factual findings regarding 
Catherine's employability are reversible as clear error. 
This error in citing to a Dr. Darrell Anderson was only corrected in a 
subsequent order by counsel for Mark. (R. 613, ^ 4). 
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C. The Trial Court's Findings In Regard To Catherine's Monthly 
Expenses Were Clearly Erroneous, 
The trial courts miscalculations of Catherine's monthly expenses were the basis for 
its award of alimony. The award based upon faulty mathematical calculations was clearly 
an abuse of discretion. Mark has failed to adequately address this clear error in his brief. 
This court has previously reversed and remanded a trial court's miscalculations. See, 
Bruer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716, 731-32 (Utah Ct App 1990). 
D. The Trial Court Erred In Its Factual Findings Regarding Alimony. 
The trial court's factual findings regarding alimony are erroneous because they do 
not adequately detail "and include enough subsidiary facts" to support the trial court's 
ultimate conclusion. See, Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Utah Ct App 1994). Judge 
Dever made findings based on speculation, not supported by the record or that were 
contradictory to other findings. The trial court made the finding that Catherine should not 
be denied her supplements, (R. 578), and made a finding that these supplements, should 
be included, not as a medical expense, but in food and household supplies. (R. 722). 
However, the trial court failed to increase Catherine's food and household expenses to 
account for the supplements, and made no finding as to what amount Catherine was 
allotted for supplements. 
Further, the trial court arbitrarily reduced Catherine's claims for auto expenses, 
gifts, and travel without providing a reason for the reduction, other than to say it "seemed 
too high." (R. 775). 
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E. The Trial Court's Findings Regarding Future Retirement Payments 
And Future Events Were Clearly Erroneous, 
The trial court erred by reducing Catherine's future alimony based on her receiving 
a specific amount from Mark's retirement, though it was unknown at the time of trial 
when Mark would retire or what amount Catherine would receive. The trial court found 
that Catherine would receive at least $2,111.00 per month from Mark's retirement 
account, based solely on Mark's testimony. (Petitioner's Exhibit 22, R. 741, p. 121-25). 
Over counsel's objections, Mark testified that he calculated the figures using "average 
rates of return." (R. 741, p. 121:4-24). No testimony was given by any person from 
TIAA-CREF to determine what retirement benefit Catherine might be entitled to or when. 
Mark has not yet retired so any "guess" as to what Catherine would be entitled to 
at retirement is purely speculative. (R. 741, pp. 88:11-25, 89:1-13). Further, no findings 
were made as to what Catherine's future needs or what Mark's ability to pay might be. 
Mark provides no support for his statement that the trial court "determined facts relative 
to the parties' present situation and the foreseeable future based upon the facts." (Brief of 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant, p. 30). The testimony was that Mark was 65 at the time of 
trial, and that he hoped to retire from the University in two to three years, but that he 
might do "emeritus-type work" (R. 741, pp. 88:13-25, 89:7-20), or work in the consulting 
field. (R. 741 p.l65:l-10, 22-25). The trial court erred in basing its factual finding 
regarding income from a future annuity on Mark's calculations and then making 
downward adjustments in Catherine's alimony based upon those future unknowns. 
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F. The Standard Of Review Of The Court's Division Of Debts And 
Personal Property Is An Abuse Of Discretion. 
Mark has argued that as to the division of debts and personal property, the 
appropriate standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard. Appellant disagrees. 
In Hill v. Hill 869 P.2d 963, 966-967 (Utah Ct App 1994), this court rejected an 
argument that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering husband to pay 87% of the 
debt. "In a divorce action, there is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division 
of debts. However, such allocation must be based upon adequate factual findings which 
ruling we will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion." Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 
1065, 1067 (Utah Ct App 1994). Property awards "will be upheld on appeal unless a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 
1209, 1211 (Utah Ct App 1991), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
POINT II. APPELLANT HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE. 
Husband asks for a "gotcha" rule when he asserts that the trial court should be 
affirmed based on a supposed failure on the part of Catherine to marshal the evidence. 
A. Marshaling The Evidence Does Not Require A Complete Reproduction 
Of The Trial Court Record. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states in relevant part: "A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." The Utah Supreme Court had previously stated, "[t]his requires 
counsel to construct the evidence supporting the adversary's position, and then 'ferret out 
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a fatal flaw in the evidence.'" Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, et aL 2007 UT 42, ^  17 
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 1991)). 
In Martinez, the petitioner argued that this Court erred by not dismissing the 
respondent's factual challenge to the Utah Labor Commission's order based upon 
respondent's failure to marshal the evidence. The Supreme Court labeled the assertion 
that a reviewing court is bound to dismiss a case where the evidence has not been 
marshaled, "a fundamental misunderstanding of the marshaling obligation." Id. at f 16. 
The Supreme Court further clarified the marshaling requirement as follows: 
In our zeal to emphasize the importance of the marshaling requirement to 
parties, we have used language implying that appellate courts are strictly 
bound to affirm the accuracy of the agency's or trial court's factual findings 
in the absence of marshaling . . . Despite this language, the marshaling 
requirement is not a limitation on the power of the appellate courts. Rather, 
it is a tool pursuant to which the appellate courts impose on the parties an 
obligation to assist them in conducting a whole record review. It is not, 
itself, a rule of substantive law. Consequently, parties that fail to marshal 
the evidence do so at risk that the reviewing court will decline, in its 
discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings. 
(Internal citations and quotations omitted). 
The marshaling requirement should be viewed as an aid to this Court, not an 
opportunity for an opposing party to point to irrelevant facts not included in a brief. Mark 
argues that Catherine "utterly failed to marshal the evidence below." (Appellee's Brief, 
p. 23). Given that alimony is at issue, Mark's interpretation of the marshaling rule would 
require Catherine to restate three days of testimony and hundreds of pleadings in order to 
set forth every minute factual detail that may have supported the trial court's findings. 
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Mark is attempting to avoid responding to Catherine's argument by asserting a "gotcha" 
theory of the marshaling requirement. 
Mark cited to Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App. 282, in support of his argument that 
Catherine failed to marshal the evidence. In Davis, at ^  10, husband argued that the trial 
court miscalculated the wife's income and monthly expenses in its award of alimony to 
the wife, by overlooking the retirement contribution and mistakenly including a car 
payment as part of her expenses. The court chided the husband, stating that he was 
merely rearguing his case and "ignored the factual support for the trial court's decision to 
award Wife $1,000 in monthly alimony." Davis, 2003 UT App at f 10. 
In Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct App 1987), this Court 
addressed the marshaling requirement as it relates to the necessity to cite to the record. In 
Fitzgerald, this Court found that the appellant failed to marshal the evidence when he 
simply entitled one section of the brief "FACTS" and then set forth his version of the 
facts and the appellee's version of the facts. The appellant also failed to set forth "the 
requisite presentation of supporting evidence" in the argument. 744 P.2d at 304. 
Davis and Fitzgerald are distinguishable from this case. Catherine set forth the 
known and pertinent facts on which the trial court made its findings, and cited extensively 
to the record. Catherine's "Statement of Facts" consists of 29 pages, and additional 
citations to the record are found in her "Argument" section. 
Mark has confused the marshaling rule with the requirement that the trial court 
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make sufficient findings to support its decision. Much of Catherine's argument is based 
on the trial court's failure to make sufficient findings. In some instances, there was little 
to marshal. For example, the trial court made a single finding regarding attorney fees: 
"[t]he Respondent does not have the means to pay all of the attorney fees generated by 
this matter." (Appellant's Brief, p. 58). 
Although page constraints, prevent a complete recitation of the facts marshaled in 
Catherine's Brief, the following are some examples: 
(1) Imputation of income. Catherine pointed out that the trial court entered 
an order based upon the parties' stipulation that Catherine undergo a vocational 
examination. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7). Dr. Farnsworth testified Catherine could work in 
a professional position and have a salary from $22,880.00 to $39,104.00. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 16). Catherine included numerous facts regarding Catherine's work history. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 8, 13-14). 
(2) Amount of Alimony. Mark accuses Catherine of not marshaling the 
evidence by failing to include the fact that she had three telephone providers, and two 
separate internet providers. (Brief of Appellee p. 26). This is incorrect. Catherine 
quoted the findings of the trial court that she had three telephone lines and two internet 
providers. (Appellant's Brief, p. 43). Catherine's Brief contained details of her monthly 
needs and the courts consideration and miscalculation of those monthly expenses. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-30). Mark's argument that Catherine failed to marshal the 
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evidence is contradicted by the contents of Catherine's Brief. 
(3) The Reduction and Elimination of Alimony Based Upon Future Events, 
Catherine acknowledged the parties ages and that Catherine would be entitled to receive 
payments from Mark's retirement, and that Mark testified that Catherine would be 
entitled to monthly payments of $2,111.00. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 11, 50-53). Further, 
Catherine would be eligible for social security at the age of 66. (Appellant's Brief, p. 30). 
(4) Division of Debts. Mark set forth Catherine's "personal" use of funds from 
the parties' Key Bank debt. These points were clearly articulated in Catherine's Brief. 
Catherine testified that she used the Key Bank line to pay for an appraisal, collaborative 
law legal fees, attorney fees for present counsel, and a new computer and printer. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 33). Once again, Mark misstates by pointing to alleged omissions 
which were clearly stated in Catherine's brief. 
(5) The Savings Account And Tax Refund To Pay Marital Debt. Catherine 
stated that the parties' exercised a stock option in 2005 which netted $21,298.00, which 
they placed in a Smith Barney account. (Appellant's Brief, p. 32). She further stated that 
the parties had marital debt of $24,548.00 to Key Bank for a line of credit. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 32). Other than what Catherine set forth in her statement of facts or reciting all 
of the testimony of the parties, there is no other evidence to marshal in support of the trial 
courts findings. 
In the instances in which Catherine has challenged the trial courts factual findings, 
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she has fully marshaled the evidence. Catherine provided this court with any apparent 
factual basis for the trial court's findings. Mark's challenge to Catherine's marshaling of 
the evidence is merely an attempt to distract this Court. Instead of responding to 
Catherine's arguments, Mark sidesteps the court's clear errors by running up the 
"marshaling flag". This avoidance technique should not be condoned by this court. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE IMPUTED INCOME. 
In his brief, Mark glossed over or failed to address the errors made by the trial 
court. The fact that a witness used the word ADD in the course of answering a question 
does not justify the courts specific finding that "Dr. Mangum diagnosed Catherine with 
ADHD." That is clear error, which error is exacerbated by the trial courts earlier finding 
that a Dr. Darrell Anderson had testified, when no such witness testified, and further 
compounded by the courts specific finding that Dr. Clegg treated Catherine since 1981. 
(R. 572). Those facts were not in the record, but were later corrected. (R. 665, 767). 
Contrary to the representations of Mark, Catherine provided the evaluation of her 
employability by Dr. Vickie Gregory. Dr. Gregory performs psychological evaluations, 
assesses capacity to perform work and earn money and has performed vocational 
analyses. (R. 742 p.377:22-25, p.378:l-l 1). Unlike Dr. Farnsworth, who did not review 
medical records, Dr. Gregory spent substantial time reviewing extensive medical records. 
(R. 742 p.377-376). Dr. Gregory found that Catherine had a number of physical problems 
and suffered from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, a major psychiatric disorder and 
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cognitive deficits. (R. 742 p.382:17-21; 385:8-10). 
Further, Mark failed to address the fact that Catherine had been out of the 
workforce since 1981. Instead, he argues that Catherine has a high IQ, and that Dr. 
Gregory did not independently test her computer skills. (Brief of Appellee p. 21). It is 
important to note that Dr. Farnsworth did not test Catherine's computer skills either. 
Mark gratuitously argued that Dr. Farns worth determined that Catherine's lack of recent 
expertise or training may reduce her rate of compensation, (Brief of Appellee p.22), but, 
completely failed to address Dr. Gregory's diagnosis of a major psychiatric disorder. 
Again, Dr. Clegg, recommended that Catherine seek psychiatric testing. (R. 355). Mark 
did not address the court's finding that "nearly all of the experts testified that Catherine 
was capable of working" (R. 573, 666, 768), when there is no support for that finding in 
the record. While, Dr. Farnsworth testified that Catherine was capable of working, 
contrary testimony was provided by Dr. Mangum, Dr. Robbins, Dr. Gregory, and was 
implicit in the testimony of Dr. Clegg. The fact that the trial court imputed $1,560.00 per 
month to Catherine rather than the range of $22,880.00 - $39,144.00 per year, as Dr. 
Farnsworth suggested she was able to earn in her analysis of employability is of little 
moment when the testimony and evidence was overwhelmingly contrary. 
As stated in Willev v. Willey. 866 P.2d 547 (Utah Ct App 1993), if the court 
wishes to impute income, the findings of fact must be sufficient to support the conclusion. 
Id. at 230. In Willev. this Court reversed the trial court because it had not taken into 
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account the historical earnings and current situation of Mrs. Willey. Id. at 554. Judge 
Dever also premised the imputation of income upon "mere conjecture;" and did not make 
a "careful and precise assessment requiring detailed findings." Id. at 554. The trial court 
abused its discretion and erred in imputing income to a 62 year old woman who had been 
out of the workforce since 1981, when she was forced to leave due to health issues, and 
who has since been diagnosed with a major psychiatric disorder, which prevents her from 
securing and holding a job. In the face of those facts, the findings of the court are clearly 
erroneous. 
POINT IV. THE AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Contrary to Mark's argument, the court miscalculated Catherine's needs. Mark 
argues that the court found that Catherine's housing costs and utilities were $1,289.00. 
Nowhere in the record is there any such finding. In the court's consideration of 
Catherine's needs, the court referenced Catherine's Financial Declaration and made eight 
adjustments, as follows: (1) maintenance: $200 rather than $289; (2) telephone: $125 
rather than $213; (3) medical: $634 rather than $1,240; (4) entertainment: $100 rather 
than $119; (5) gifts: $50 rather than $146; (6) travel: $200 rather than $265; (7) auto 
expenses: $223 rather than $443, and (8) other: $157 rather than $495. (R. 774-777). 
That would reduce Catherine's expenses by $1,521.00. Catherine's claimed expenses of 
$6,785.00 less $1,521.00 equals $5,264.00. 
Mark speculates that the court had something in mind other than acknowledging 
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the rest of Catherine's expenses as appropriate. When the "adjusted" expenses are added 
to the remaining expenses, the total monthly expenses are as follows: 
Catherine's Expenses Trial Court's Adjustment 
1st mortgage 1,148.00 
2nd mortgage 247.00 
Real property taxes (res) 150.00 
Real property insurance (res) 38.00 
Maintenance (res) 200.00 
Food/household supplies 567.00 
Utilities: Electricity 50.00 
Natural gas 89.00 
Water 14.00 
Sewer 5.00 
Garbage 13.00 
Telephone 125.00 
Laundry and dry cleaning 25.00 
Clothing 101.00 
Insurance 20.00 
Medical 634.00 
Dental 42.00 
Entertainment 100.00 
Gifts 50.00 
Donations 10.00 
Travel 200.00 
Auto expenses 223.00 
Auto payments 308.00 
Credit card debt 748.00 
Other expenses 157.QQ 
Total 5,264.00 
The difference between $5,264.00 and $4,293.00, or the miscalculation of the 
court, totals $971.00. There are no findings in the record to explain how the court found 
Catherine's monthly need to be $4,293.00. Mark's assertion that the sum of $1,289.00 
was the difference between the adjusted amounts and what the court found to be 
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Catherine's needs is nonsensical and found nowhere in the record. (Brief of Appellee pp. 
24 - 25). 
Mark is asking this court to speculate as to what the trial court did, or is arguing 
that the trial court did not wish to speculate as to some of Catherine's future expenses, 
and therefore, adopted an additional monthly need of $1,289.00. In either event, the trial 
court's approach is contrary to the law in the State of Utah. See Willey v. Willey. 914 
P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct App 1996), and Cox v. Cox. 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah Ct App 1994). 
Contrary to Mark's assertions in his Brief, Catherine provided evidence of the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage (R. 742 p.469:15-25; p. 470:1-24). 
Further, early in the action, Catherine submitted a statement of monthly expenses totaling 
$6,756.00 per month, excluding a tax reserve or Cobra coverage. (R. 52-53). Indeed, the 
parties stipulated to a temporary order in which Mark agreed to pay expenses, totaling, 
approximately, $4,558.78 per month (R. 83-85). This was modified to $5,708.00 per 
month temporary alimony, by an order of the court dated March 15, 2006 (R. 344-347). 
Mark has alleged that Catherine is requesting a windfall in requesting that the 
court's prior order regarding the Cobra premium be adhered to. The stipulated Order of 
Bifurcation required Mark to pay Catherine's Cobra insurance through February of 2008. 
This was a primary basis for the stipulation. (R. 64). Despite this order, the trial court 
ordered that the payment of that Cobra premium would be deducted from the monthly 
alimony. (R. 779 If20). If the trial court had awarded alimony in an amount which met 
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Catherine's needs, including Cobra premiums, then the courts rejection of the prior order 
would not be of moment. Catherine is not attempting to receive a windfall or "double-
dip" but is objecting to the trial court's failure to enforce the Order of Bifurcation. 
Further, Catherine's argument that the court should not have included speculative 
royalty payments to reduce her monthly need is not inconsistent with her testimony. The 
parties stipulated to divide prospective royalties for existing inventions that had been 
patented as of the date of the divorce. (R. 741 p. 27:9-18). On page 8 of her Financial 
Declaration, under "other assets" Catherine indicated that there were four currently 
licensed patents and that the nine year average earnings were $8,987.00 per year. 
(Respondent's Exhibit 25 p. 8). Mark's Financial Declaration, Petitioner's Exhibit 9, set 
forth a monthly royalty income average, of $281.50. The trial court arrived at a figure of 
$375.00 and imputed that monthly gross against Catherine's expenses. There was no clear 
evidence to support the trial court's adding $375.00 to Catherine's income. It is logical to 
simply acknowledge that each party should receive 50% of whatever uncertain royalties 
are received in the future. 
Mark did not respond to the trial court's failure to consider the testimony of Robert 
Cole, who provided clear and cogent evidence of the tax impact of alimony and what 
award would be necessary to equalize the parties' standards of living by equalizing net 
income. (R. 742 p. 448:12-20, p. 462:13-18). Mr. Cole testified that in order for 
Catherine to net $5,690.00, per month, she would need $7,318.00, and that a failure to 
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account for taxation consequences of an award of alimony would result in an inaccurate 
alimony award. (R. 742 p.448:12-20, p. 462:13-18). As the trial court did not reference 
Mr. Cole's testimony in its findings, it must be assumed that the trial court did not 
consider the impact of taxes in the award of alimony. Mark failed to address the error 
made by the court in failing to recognize that imputed gross income cannot be offset 
against net need. The trial court refused to address the issue of taxation and consistently 
offset gross income or alimony against net need. Catherine requested that the trial court 
address this error in a post-trial motion, but the court declined. (R. 722 f 8). 
The trial courts findings and conclusions are unsupportable and the award of 
alimony is inequitable and the alimony award should be modified by this court. See 
Higley v. Higley. 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983) and Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 75 
(Utah Ct App 1988). Mark cited Willey v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997), in support 
of his assertion that it would be error for this court to consider modifying the alimony 
award unless there were stipulated facts pertaining to the expenses. (Brief of Appellee p. 
28). However, that was not the holding of Willey. The Utah Supreme Court, in its 
analysis, reiterated the necessity that the trial court make explicit findings in support of its 
legal conclusions, thus enabling an appellate court to determine if the trial court had 
abused its discretion. The Willey court recognized that without adequate findings of fact, 
there can be no meaningful appellate review. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 
1997). However, the court in Willey also acknowledged that in certain instances the 
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appellate court may exercise its equitable powers and weigh the evidence and make its 
own findings, when the appellate court is in an equal position with the trial court with 
respect to the facts and evidence at issue. Id. at 231. Catherine has provided sufficient 
evidence to this court to enable this court to provide direction on remand and enter 
findings in relation to the many errors made by the trial court. 
POINT V. THE REDUCTION OF ALIMONY WAS IN ERROR. 
In Point III of his Brief, Mark has set forth facts A - L which he states Catherine 
has not marshaled. Indeed, Catherine has included all but one or two of those facts in her 
statement of facts or argument. Further, none of the articulated facts support the trial 
court's rapid step-down of alimony, as the step-down is based upon speculative future 
events, or Mark's calculation of Catherine's retirement benefit. The trial courts reduction 
of Catherine's inadequate alimony also fails to account for either Mark or Catherine's 
future circumstances. The findings and conclusions of the court in regard to this 
reduction and termination of alimony is contrary to case law in the State of Utah and 
should be reversed. See Munns v. Munns. 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct App 1990). 
POINT VI. THE KEY BANK DEBT WAS UNFAIRLY DIVIDED. 
While Catherine acknowledges that the Penny Appraisal was not used to determine 
values, it was the seminal exhibit used by the court in the division of personalty. 
Testimony and exhibits were adduced utilizing this appraisal, including which items were 
considered by Mark to be separate and the parties' proposed divisions of the personal 
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property. Also, the trial court used the appraisal in dividing the items of personalty, with 
specific references to the lists and numbers set forth on the appraisal. (R. 769-771 f 7-9). 
Further, Mark admitted that he had agreed to pay Catherine's collaborative law 
expenses, but now argues that it was only if she "participated in good faith," with Mark as 
the arbiter of whether good faith was exercised. (Brief of Appellee p. 33). Catherine 
acknowledged that $4,080.00 of the Key Bank debt was her separate personal debt. The 
balance of that debt was to Penny Group, the collaborative lawyer, and for attorneys fees 
and accounting fees for the divorce action. This court has made it clear that any division 
of debt must be equitable. Bradford v. Bradford. 1999 Utah App. 373 ^25. Further, 
U.C.A. §30-3-3 provides the trial court with authority to award Catherine fees and costs, 
which the court failed to do, as addressed by Catherine in Point VII. 
POINT VIL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AWARDED AND ITS REFUSAL TO AWARD COSTS. 
A. The Trial Court Failed to Make Adequate Findings 
Catherine and Mark are in agreement on one point: The trial court failed to make 
adequate findings pertaining to attorney's fees. (Brief of Appellee p. 37). Mark's 
unusual argument, however, is that since the trial court failed to make findings, it is an 
abuse of discretion to award any fees to Catherine and that it is a greater abuse of 
discretion to award her a greater amount of fees. Indeed, the trial court erred when it 
awarded only $8,000.00 in attorneys fees without any explanation as to how he arrived at 
this figure, and without considering Mark's ability to pay. The trial court's failure to 
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make findings and failure to award all of Catherine's fees is an abuse of discretion. 
Haumont v. Haumont 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah Ct App 1990). 
B. The Trial Court's Failure To Award Or Make Findings Regarding 
Costs Is An Abuse of Discretion. 
Mark's argument that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to 
award Catherine costs but that its findings on attorney's fees are inadequate, is 
disingenuous. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 gives authority to the trial court to award costs 
and witness fees. A denial of fees and costs "must be based on evidence of the financial 
need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness 
of the requested fees." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 338, 444 (Utah Ct App 1998). 
Mark's assertion that the trial court made a proper finding regarding Catherine's 
request for costs is unsupportable. The record is void of any findings in support of the 
denial of costs. There was no consideration of Catherine's financial needs, Mark's ability 
to pay, or the reasonableness of the request. The sole finding of the trial court on 
Catherine's request for costs was, "[t]he cost of experts will be borne by the party calling 
the expert." (R. 774 f 18, 763 f 24.) The trial court erred by not making the necessary 
findings regarding Catherine's request for costs, particularly when it has previously found 
that Catherine did not have the means to pay all of her attorneys fees. (R. 754 f 9). 
C. Catherine Is Entitled To Attorney's Fees And Costs On Appeal. 
"[W]here the trial court has awarded attorney fees and the receiving spouse has 
prevailed on the main issues, we generally award fees on appeal." Elman v. Elman, 2002 
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UT App 83,143 (quoting Rosendahl v. Rosendahl 876 P.2d 870, 875 (Utah Ct App 
1994)). Should Catherine prevail on any or all of the issues raised on appeal, she should 
be awarded her fees and costs on appeal. 
POINT VIII. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED 
CATHERINE AN INTEREST IN FUTURE PATENTS. 
Mark asserts that the court erred in its award of an interest in future royalties from 
patents and inventions. Mark's argument is confusing, given that in Point IV of his Brief, 
he argued that the trial court did not err in the formula used in dividing future patents. 
(Brief of Appellee pp. 31-32). Mark asserts in Point IX of his Brief, that the trial court 
did err in awarding Catherine an interest in future patents. 
Catherine has a marital interest in income from patents and royalties that are the 
result of efforts made during the marriage. "[T]he right to future income is a marital asset 
where that right is derived from efforts or products produced during the marriage, even in 
cases where the right cannot be easily valued." Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1318 
(Utah Ct App 1990) (citing Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 56-57 (Utah Ct App 1990)). 
Mark misapplied the holding in Dunn, arguing that Dunn prohibits trial courts 
from awarding royalty payments to a former spouse based upon required future services. 
In Dunn, husband received two separate royalty payments for his invention of surgical 
instruments for knee replacements and hip replacements. Id. at 1319. Wife asserted an 
interest in royalties from the instruments for knee replacement, but did not seek royalties 
from the hip replacement instruments. Id. Under the contract for the hip replacement 
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instruments, husband was required to perform additional services. Id. The Court held 
that husband was entitled to be "recompensed" for the time he spent promoting the hip 
replacement instruments for which the wife was not making any claim. Id. 
The present case is distinguishable from Dunn. Catherine did seek an interest in 
money received from patents after the date of the parties' divorce. Mark acknowledged 
that he was working on projects which may result in patents and royalties. (R. 741 p.88). 
Catherine should receive a portion of income for projects that were in process during the 
marriage. The two year window provided by the trial court intends to capture those 
projects. Nothing in the record indicates that the income that might be received from 
patents are conditioned on Mark's future services. The parties were married for 
approximately 32 years, during which time Mark acquired the knowledge and skills to 
create patentable inventions. (R. 651at f 1). 
Mark has ignored the 20 year history of royalty payments that the parties have 
received, (R. 743, p. 542:24-25, 543:1-3) and argues that Catherine should not be entitled 
to income from future patents because the patents are property of the University of Utah, 
the payments on those patents would not be made solely to Mark, Mark is performing less 
research, and because he is not the "primary investigator on some projects." (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 40, f E). Mark cannot point to any facts in the record that show that future 
payments for patents would be treated any differently than they have been over the last 
twenty years. Although Catherine has disputed the manner in which future income from 
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patents and royalties should be divided, the trial court did not err in awarding Catherine 
an interest in such future income. 
POINT IX. MARK'S APPEAL OF THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
Mark has failed to adequately brief Point X. "A reviewing court is entitled to have 
the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in 
which [a party] may dump the burden of argument and research." Ellis v. Swenson, 2000 
UT 101,^17. When a party fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 24, the 
reviewing court declines to address the issue. Id- at f 18. 
Mark has failed to make an argument, cite to any law or the record, in support of 
Point X of his cross-appeal. Instead, Mark refers the Court to his response to Catherine's 
appeal of attorney's fees, contained in his Point VIII, "Mark contests any award to her as 
improper, as contained in his cross-appeal, Point X below." (Brief of Appellee, p. 37). 
Mark completely failed to brief the award of attorney's fees in his cross-appeal and this 
Court should decline to address Point X of Mark's cross-appeal. 
POINT X, MARK'S ARGUMENT REGARDING MARITAL DEBT SHOULD 
BE REJECTED. 
This Court should reject Mark's argument in Point XI due to his failure to marshal 
the evidence or cite to relevant legal authority. Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requires parties to cite to "the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on" in the argument section of a brief. This Court has previously held that it 
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will uphold the trial court's findings "if the party challenging the findings fails to 
appropriately marshal all the evidence supporting the findings." A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const., 1999 UT App 87, f 27. When a party fails to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 24, the reviewing court declines to address the 
issue. Ellis v. Swenson. 2000 UT 101 at [^18. 
Mark has failed to provide the Court with any citations to the record, other than to 
a single addendum in Catherine's Brief. Further, Mark has failed to cite to any legal 
authority that supports his position, in violation of Rule 24. As such, it is appropriate for 
this Court to decline to address Point XI of Mark's Brief. 
Further, Mark's trial exhibit, appended to Catherine's Motion to Clarify and 
Amend Order and Judgment, revealed $1,355.56 in marital debt at date of separation, 
excluding the Honda loan. (R. 601). The trial court made specific findings as to what 
was marital debt, and how post separation debt would be divided. (R. 761, 762f 19). 
Based upon the courts clear findings and Mark's failure to provide support in the record 
for his argument, the trial courts ruling as to this issue should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Catherine has marshaled the evidence to support her appeal. For the reasons set 
forth in Catherine's Brief, the trial court should be reversed as prayed for therein. 
Mark's cross-appeal is not supported by case law or the record, and the trial courts 
determinations from whence Mark has appealed should be affirmed. 
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